TY - JOUR
T1 - The Effect of Peer Comparisons on Polluters
T2 - A Randomized Field Experiment among Wastewater Dischargers
AU - Earnhart, Dietrich
AU - Ferraro, Paul J.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank John Veresh for his indispensable insight on the EPA data; Marisa Henry for assistance with the registered pre-analysis plan and for conducting the semi-structured interviews; Bill Ball, Ed Bouwer, and Stacey Lamer for their insights into wastewater treatment facility managers and operations; and Ben Balmford, Paul Feldman, Ben Meiselman, and two anonymous referees for comments that improved the manuscript.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature B.V.
PY - 2021/8
Y1 - 2021/8
N2 - Peer comparisons combine descriptive and injunctive messages about social norms. In experiments, these comparisons have encouraged pro-environmental behaviors among consumers. Consumers, however, are not the only sources of environmental externalities. Firms and other organizations also damage the environment. Yet organizations may not respond to peer comparisons in the same way that consumers respond because organizations have different objectives, constraints, and decision-making processes. In a pre-registered field experiment with 328 municipal wastewater treatment facilities in Kansas, we randomly sent some facilities a certified letter that contrasted, using text and a graphic, each facility’s discharge behavior to the behaviors of other facilities in the state. We estimate the effect of these peer comparisons on the degree to which the recipient facilities complied with discharge limits under the U.S. Clean Water Act. On average, letter recipients reported discharge ratios 8% lower than non-recipients in the eighteen-month period after letters were sent (95% CI [-15%, -1%]), although we cannot detect an effect in all post-treatment quarters. We believe that the results warrant further experimental replications and extensions to examine the cost-effectiveness of reducing pollution through peer comparisons.
AB - Peer comparisons combine descriptive and injunctive messages about social norms. In experiments, these comparisons have encouraged pro-environmental behaviors among consumers. Consumers, however, are not the only sources of environmental externalities. Firms and other organizations also damage the environment. Yet organizations may not respond to peer comparisons in the same way that consumers respond because organizations have different objectives, constraints, and decision-making processes. In a pre-registered field experiment with 328 municipal wastewater treatment facilities in Kansas, we randomly sent some facilities a certified letter that contrasted, using text and a graphic, each facility’s discharge behavior to the behaviors of other facilities in the state. We estimate the effect of these peer comparisons on the degree to which the recipient facilities complied with discharge limits under the U.S. Clean Water Act. On average, letter recipients reported discharge ratios 8% lower than non-recipients in the eighteen-month period after letters were sent (95% CI [-15%, -1%]), although we cannot detect an effect in all post-treatment quarters. We believe that the results warrant further experimental replications and extensions to examine the cost-effectiveness of reducing pollution through peer comparisons.
KW - D23
KW - D91
KW - Environmental management
KW - K32
KW - K42
KW - Nudges
KW - Pollution
KW - Q53
KW - Q58
KW - Randomized controlled trial
KW - Regulatory compliance
KW - Social comparisons
KW - Voluntary approaches
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U2 - 10.1007/s10640-020-00522-0
DO - 10.1007/s10640-020-00522-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85095713958
SN - 0924-6460
VL - 79
SP - 627
EP - 652
JO - Environmental and Resource Economics
JF - Environmental and Resource Economics
IS - 4
ER -